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Abstract 
Credible fiscal plans that aim at restoring fiscal sustainability will be essential 
to counter the present increase in debt levels all across Europe. The 
macroeconomic scenario of such plans will be crucial. This paper assesses 
whether there is any advantage in delegating (part of) such power to supra-
national forecasts. The evidence on the relative performance of the European 
Commission’s (EC) growth forecast is rather mixed, with considerable 
variation at the country level. Some national government forecasts (France, 
Italy, and Portugal) perform worse in terms of descriptive statistics than the 
EC forecast for all forecast horizons. For the year ahead the EC growth 
forecast is better than the official forecasts for almost ¾ of the EU-15 
countries. All in all, since the EC forecast appears to be a good benchmark, in 
order to reduce the (optimistic) forecast bias, national governments could be 
forced to justify any large (optimistic) deviation from this benchmark when 
presenting their respective national stability and growth programmes.  
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Introduction 
Government support for the financial sector and for hard-hit industries in the 
2008/2009 financial and economic crisis has greatly increased the public debt levels in 
many European countries, posing a serious challenge to fiscal sustainability at a time 
of increased spending pressures caused by ageing populations. Hence, there is now a 
greater need for close monitoring of fiscal developments: fiscal outcomes, but fiscal 
plans, too.  
Credible fiscal plans that aim at restoring fiscal sustainability will be essential. 
Yet governments can present a rosier picture of public finances by basing their fiscal 
forecasts on optimistic economic growth assumptions.  
There are several reasons why government growth forecasts are typically more 
optimistic than the outcome, but if there is no bias towards optimism in the forecasts 
produced by supranational organizations, it is evidence that such forecasting errors 
are due to the strategic use of optimistic economic growth forecasts, rather than the 
outcome of true (unbiased) forecast errors. 
This paper compares the accuracy of (national) EU governments’ own growth 
forecasts with the accuracy of supranational forecasts, particularly those of the 
European Commission (EC) and the IMF. This analysis expands the literature on the 
accuracy of fiscal and macroeconomic forecasting by making use of a real-time 
measure of outcomes and by focusing on the budget process, while simultaneously 
trying to overcome some limitations of previous studies, which have tended to rely on 
over-pooled analysis. This contribution thus adds to existing literature by providing: a 
higher degree of detail at the country level, avoiding the mix of forecast horizons (that 
could be a source of statistical problems); the first use of a full business cycle of data 
since the start of the euro, when the Stability and Growth Pact started to be enforced; 
and, a systematic detailed comparison of national government forecasts with EC and 
IMF supra-national forecasts. 
Previous related work includes that by (Jonung and Larch, 2006) which 
assesses whether potential output forecasts are systematically biased. (Beetsma et 
al., 2009) analyse the determinants of planned and budgetary adjustment 
implemented in the EU, focusing on the budgetary process and estimating the impact 
of the strength of national fiscal institutions on fiscal outcomes. (Strauch et al., 2009), 
assess the accuracy of Stability and Growth Programmes (SGPs) forecasts for the 
period 1991-2004. 
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(Jonung and Larch, 2006) supported delegating the preparation of 
macroeconomic forecasts, for the purpose of the budget process, to independent 
national offices. Along similar lines, this paper assesses if there is some advantage in 
delegating such power to supra-national forecasters. If the forecasts by the European 
Commission (EC) really perform better than national government forecasts, the bias 
in the macroeconomic assumptions which are used to draw up the medium-term fiscal 
plans could be reduced if EU countries started to use the EC forecasts, or at least if 
these countries were compelled to justify any given departure from such benchmark 
when presenting a more optimistic national forecast. This could be done through a 
revision of the code of conduct (on the submission of the Stability and Growth 
Programmes).  
But the evidence we found on the relative performance of the EC growth 
forecast is rather mixed. The accuracy of EC autumn growth forecast is not uniform 
over forecast horizons: the year-ahead forecast performs relatively well, but there is 
room for improvement in the 2-years-ahead forecast. Hence, at the individual 
country/forecast-horizon level there is just some weak evidence supporting the view 
that EU Member states would reduce their forecast bias if they followed the EC 
growth forecasts for the year-ahead period when preparing their national stability and 
growth programmes.  
However, there is considerable variation in the accuracy of national forecasts 
at the individual country level. The analysis shows that the national government 
forecasts of France, Italy, and Portugal perform worse in terms of descriptive statistics 
than the EC forecast for all forecast horizons. Taking the 15 EU countries as a whole, 
and the different forecast horizons, the EC autumn forecast appears to be a good 
benchmark. Using country-pooled data for the year-ahead forecast horizon, the 
evidence in favour of the EC forecast is the strongest.  
All in all, in order to reduce the forecast bias national governments could be 
forced to justify any large (optimistic) deviation from the EC forecast, which would 
serve as benchmark, when presenting their SGP.  
The structure of the paper is as described below. The first part looks at the role 
of forecasts in fiscal plans and contains the literature review, the methodology, and 
the empirical results. The second part discusses some policy implications and 
conclusions. 
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I. The role of forecasts in attaining fiscal sustainability 
 
A. Objectives & comparison with previous literature 
If European countries are to reduce the current (high) debt levels it will be 
necessary to pursue ambitious fiscal consolidation strategies within the framework of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, which involve some peer pressure and defines a 
differentiated medium-term objective (MTO) for each country. Much will therefore 
rely on the setting up of credible fiscal plans. Recent research has shown that the use 
of forecasts is an issue in the design of fiscal policy. When designing fiscal policy 
decisions policy-makers have to make use of (ex-ante) real-time output gap estimates 
and these usually differ from actual (ex-post) output gap estimates, which use more 
information than that available at the time of the decision (see (Orphanides and van 
Norden, 2002)).2 However, part of the difference between ex-ante and ex-post output 
gaps might be the result of a deliberate optimism in official government forecasts. 
Government use of overoptimistic macroeconomic assumptions is a practical way of 
not actually making the required fiscal consolidation effort, while appearing to be 
planning to consolidate the public finances. As (Jonung and Larch, 2006) put it, if a 
government regularly builds its budget upon an optimistic medium-term growth 
outlook, it will project a higher level of structural revenues than it would under a more 
cautious and realistic assessment. The over-projection of revenues then makes it 
possible to budget for a higher level of expenditure than would be allowed under a 
realistic growth assumption, while appearing not to be following an expansionary 
fiscal policy. As a result, the ex-post budget balance is worse than forecasted.  
So it is relevant to assess to what extent such forecast errors are genuine or 
politically motivated. If they are genuine they are likely to appear both in official 
national forecasts and in other forecasts, including the supra-national forecasts of the 
European Commission, which has a relevant role in the process of multilateral fiscal 
supervision in Europe. However, as pointed out by (Strauch, et al., 2009) the literature 
still contains little of such cross-country analysis for the advanced economies. This 
paper contributes to that strain of the literature. 
The national forecasts used in this empirical comparison are those presented in 
the annual update of each country’s Stability and Growth Programme (SGP), which 
must be submitted to Brussels by the end of the year. Our sample starts with the 1998 
vintage of programmes and ends with the 2008 programmes. As Member countries 
are subject to a common code of conduct on the submission of the national SGPs’ 
annual updates, the data is relatively homogenous, following the same ESA95 system 
                                                     
2
 See also (Forni and Momigliano, 2004) and (Marinheiro, 2008), inter alia,  for an application of real-
time data to fiscal policy. 
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of national accounts and submitted in the same time frame. All such characteristics 
enable a cross-country analysis of forecast accuracy. The delimitation of the time 
frame of the empirical analysis to broadly coincide with the time period after the 
introduction of the euro, when the Stability and Growth Pact was binding, makes the 
use of SGP data meaningful for our purposes.  
Previous studies on this subject include the seminal paper by (Artis and 
Marcellino, 2001) that analysed the track record of the IMF, OECD and EC in 
forecasting the government deficit as a ratio to GDP for the G7 countries for the 
period 1981-1994. The authors concluded that no single agency is best for all 
countries, but some agencies perform particularly well for certain countries: the IMF 
for France and Germany, the OECD and the EC for Italy and the UK. However, the 
authors have not compared the forecast accuracy of the international agencies 
concerned with the national government (official) forecasts.  
The main international organizations regularly assess the track-record of their 
own forecasts. Recent examples are: (Melander et al., 2007) for the European 
Commission forecasts; (Vogel, 2007) for OECD forecasts; and (Timmermann, 2007) for 
the IMF forecasts. These assessments usually compare the particular organization’s 
forecasts with outcomes and with competing forecasts made by other international 
organizations or with consensus forecasts. But no comparison is made with national 
government (official) forecasts.  
(Jonung and Larch, 2006) compute the forecast errors of one-year ahead 
official forecasts for the potential GDP growth and for the real GDP growth, and test 
the impact of these forecast errors on the cyclically adjusted budget balances for four 
large EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, and the UK) for the period 1998-2003. The 
accuracy of official GDP growth forecasts is also compared with the accuracy of 
European Commission forecasts, and consensus forecasts. They find an optimism bias 
and make a case for delegating forecasts to an independent forecasting authority, 
giving as examples the case of forecasts made in Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands by independent forecasters, which show no statistically significant bias. 
But their paper restricts its sample to the four large EU economies, for the year-ahead 
forecast horizon only.  
(Strauch, et al., 2009), previously circulated as (Strauch et al., 2004), assess the 
accuracy of SGP forecasts. This paper is the closest to the approach followed in our 
paper. It evaluates the performance of official forecasts for GDP growth and for the 
budget balance published in SGPs submitted by EU Member states in the period 1991-
2004 (the subset 1998-2004 is also analysed). The authors calculate standard 
descriptive statistics for national SGP forecast errors for each forecasting horizon 
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(pooling observations over the different countries), and for each country (pooling 
observations over the different projection horizons). Next they compare the SGPs’ 
forecasts by forecasting horizon (pooling observations over the different countries) 
with those made by the European Commission.  
As a result, this paper makes three contributions to the existing literature:  
 First, it provides a comprehensive and systematic comparison of 
national governments’ official forecasts with those made by the 
European Commission (and the IMF) for all the former EU-15 Member 
states.3  
 Second, the time period covered is 1998-2008, which makes this paper 
the first to assess the accuracy of SGP forecasts covering a full business 
cycle, since the start of the euro. The choice of the onset of the 3rd stage 
of EMU as the first year of our sample, when the Stability and Growth 
Pact started to be applied, makes SGP data submitted by member 
states more reliable than pre-1998 data, since the national SGP started 
to be regularly updated and assessed by the European Commission 
under the EU budgetary framework. 
 Third, the assessment is made without pooling forecast horizons. While 
considerably decreasing the number of observations, from an economic 
point of view it is natural to expect that forecast errors increase with the 
length of the forecasting horizon (h), due to greater uncertainty. 
Moreover, from an econometric point of view all the theory on forecast 
encompassing assumes that the series of forecasts to be compared 
should all be for the same forecasting horizon. For forecast horizons 
greater than one, even optimal h-steps ahead forecasts would be 
expected to have forecast errors that follow a moving-average of order 
h-1 [see (Harvey et al., 1997)]. Hence, mixing 1 to H step-ahead 
forecasts in a single pool could give rise to some distortions. As a result 
of this option, this paper presents a richly detailed description of 
forecast properties at the country level, which comes, however, at the 
expense of the power of the tests, which could be over-sized, given the 
small sample available at country level. This problem is overcome by 
also presenting country-pooled data for each forecast horizon. 
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 (Strauch, et al., 2009) have only compared the accuracy of national forecasts with the EC forecasts in 
the context of forecast encompassing.  
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B. Methodology 
The focus of the approach followed in this paper on the budget process 
determines several aspects of the testing procedure almost “automatically”, including 
the definition of the outcomes used to calculate the forecast error under analysis. The 
forecast error (e) is defined as the actual value minus the forecast value. Following an 
increasingly consensual practice in the literature, we take as the actual values 
(outcomes) not the final revised series, but a ‘real-time’ (second) estimate of the 
outcome, i.e. the estimate for the year-ahead published in the autumn by the 
European Commission, which might differ from the revised final figures.4,5 Given the 
focus on the budget process in the European Union, this approach is the most suitable 
for testing for forecast accuracy because it might be too demanding for forecasters to 
predict what the first available estimates were unable to pick up. Moreover, this real-
time data reduces the problem of methodological revisions occurring after the fiscal 
year possibly skewing results, and more importantly it is the data used by the EC in 
the monitoring of fiscal policy. As mentioned by (Artis and Marcellino, 2001) the use of 
first released data is also “most interesting from a policy perspective”. Moreover, the 
data released in the next autumn corresponds to the 2nd report of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, which is expected to incorporate all the information (half-finalized) on the 
accounts of the general government, but not all subsequent revisions in the 
government accounts, and on the GDP estimates.6  
Each EU country must present an annual update of its SGP (or a convergence 
programme for those outside the euro area) by December.7 The SGP contains 
predictions for major economic variables, including GDP growth and public finances, 
for the current year (t) and at least the next 3 years (t+3). We collected all such 
forecasts and took them as the official forecasts made in year t for the years t, t+1, 
t+2, and t+3 (t = 1998, ... , 2008).8 We take as counterpart of such official forecasts the 
European Commission (EC) Autumn forecast, which is presented in November. Since 
                                                     
4
 (Nogueira Martins and Gordo Mora, 2007) analysed the amount of revisions in deficit and debt data 
reported by national authorities to the European Commission, concluding that there is evidence 
suggesting that the size of deficits may have an impact on the way statistical offices revise data. 
5
 For example, the actual figure for GDP growth in the year 2000 corresponds to the estimate made in 
the Autumn of 2001. The exception is 2008 for which we use the first estimate published in the spring of 
2009. 
6
 As pointed out by a referee a comparison with final data might be revealing too, since it could be that 
the government forecasts were good forecasts of the final revised data, but the second release was too 
pessimistic. However, as pointed out by the referee, this is unlikely to be true.  
7
 For convenience we will use SGP to designate both the stability and growth programmes and the 
convergence programmes. 
8
 The focus on the budget process, and its timing, leads us to depart from (Artis and Marcellino, 2001) in 
the definition of the current year forecast: we are sticking to the official SGP forecasts (presented in 
November/December of year t for year t), while (Artis and Marcellino, 2001) considered the current year 
forecasts as those published in May of year t for year t. 
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the national SGPs are usually presented near the deadline in November/December of 
each year, it might be assumed that they are based on the same information set, 
especially with respect to world growth expectations, commodities prices, interest 
rates, etc., enabling a direct comparison between the national SGP forecast, and the 
EC forecast.9 
Regarding the structure of the empirical results, first, in the general descriptive 
statistics of forecast accuracy, mean forecast error (ME), mean absolute error (MAE), 
and root mean squared error (RMSE) are calculated as follows: 
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where N is the number of observations for the forecasts made in period t for period 
t+h. An optimal forecast should present no bias (a null ME). Weak efficiency also 
requires forecast errors to be uncorrelated over time. 
 Since we have competing forecasts (SGP and EC forecasts) a formal test of 
equal forecast accuracy is carried out. That is to say, two variants of the (Diebold and 
Mariano, 1995) test, with the small sample correction proposed by (Harvey, et al., 
1997), yielding the modified Diebold-Mariano (mDM) test statistic, under a quadratic 
loss function (mean squared errors), are performed. In the first variant the alternative 
to the null of equal forecasts is different forecasts; the second variant is a unilateral 
test, in which the alternative is that one forecast is better than the other, one after the 
other.10  
 The next step was the computation of formal forecast encompassing tests. 
Such tests derive from the forecast combination literature. Closely following 
(Clements and Harvey, 2009), it can be said that a combination of h-steps-ahead 
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 Some countries have presented some SGP updates before November. However, some of the annual 
updates referring to year t were only submitted in the course of the next year (t+1), which introduces a 
bias towards increased accuracy of current year forecasts, since the year of reference was already 
completed (i.e. in such cases the published numbers are not a true forecast but a first estimate). This 
has occurred principally in the first years of the sample period, or when there were government 
changes occurring near the end of the fiscal year, and again in the 2008 update of SGPs, which were 
presented by January 2009, due to the anti-crisis plan launched by the European Commission in 
December 2008. 
10
 The mDM test is includes a correction for serial correlation, considering a lag of 1, and not h-1, due to 
the small number of observations at the country level for each forecast horizon. The exception is for 
Austria (t+2), for the budget balance, where no correction for autocorrelation is being made. For panel 
(country-pooled) results, for each time horizon, a window to take into account the panel structure is 
used, relying on the N dimension to provide consistency, making use of “clustered standard error 
calculations”. Since the T dimension is relatively small correcting for arbitrary correlation patterns is 
possible, with the calculation being performed in WinRATS, with “robust errors” and “lwindow = panel” 
as options. 
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forecasts, f1t+h and f2t+h, designed to improve the predictive accuracy of the quantity 
yt+h, is given by:   
 1 2(1 )ct h t h t hf f f       (1) 
With forecast errors eit = yt – fit (i = 1, 2). This formulation assumes the 
individual forecasts are unbiased. Yet, in practice the available forecasts may be 
biased, presenting a non-zero mean forecast error, and might also not be efficient.11 
Relaxing the assumptions about the forecasts, allowing the possibility of biased and 
inefficient forecasts, the implicit assumption that the combination weights sum to one 
is relaxed, and we get the general formulation: 
 1 1 2 2ct h t h t hf f f        (2) 
In this setup, the concept of forecast encompassing relates to whether or not 
one forecast encapsulates all the useful predictive information contained in a second 
forecast. Formally, using a squared error loss function as above, f1t+h is said to 
encompass f2t+h if, in a linear combination of the two forecasts, f2t+h optimally receives 
zero weight, so that combining  f1t+h with f2t+h does not lead to a reduction in the mean 
squared forecast error. Hence f1t+h encompasses f2t+h in (1) if the optimal value of  is 
zero. Still following (Clements and Harvey, 2009) there are 3 alternative definitions of 
forecast encompassing that could be given a regression interpretation, as follows. The 
more general [Fair-Shiller] formulation states that f1t+h encompasses f2t+h implies β = 0 
in the regression: 
FE(1):   1 1 2 2t h t h t h ty f f          
Imposing the restrictions α = 0 and β1 + β2 = 1, [Nelson, and Granger and Newbold] 
encompassing is defined by  = 0 in the regression: 
FE(2):   1 1 2( )t h t h t h t he e e        
Assuming f1t+h to be efficient, i.e. imposing α = 0 and β1 = 1 in FE(1), [Chong and 
Hendry] encompassing is defined by  = 0 in the regression: 
FE(3):   1 2t h t h t he f      
In the empirical application, we have chosen the alternative hypothesis to be 
one-sided (β2 > 0) in FE(1), in order to rule out the possibility of negative combination 
weights. We first take the most straightforward approach and regress the equations 
                                                     
11
 A generic forecast is said to be Mincer-Zarnowitz efficient if α = 0 and β = 1 in a regression 
t t ty f     , which implies that the forecast and the forecast error are uncorrelated. 
10 
 
by OLS and test the null. However, this approach might not be robust to the 
properties of the forecast errors.12 Hence, we have also calculated a modified Diebold-
Mariano test for the more general formulation FE(1) [not reported], which in general 
gives rise to the same conclusions. For all such testing procedures, the small sample 
size at country level requires care in the interpretation of the test statistics. 
 
C. Empirical Results 
1. Impact of errors in growth forecast for the budget balance forecasts 
Firstly, it is quite relevant to determine to what extent the deviation of actual 
economic growth from the official forecasts explains the forecast errors in the official 
budget balances forecasts.13 (European Commission, 2007) concluded that the main 
risks to budgetary projections were “(i) optimistic macroeconomic projections, (ii) 
slippages of government expenditures [...]”. Following (Strauch, et al., 2009) the 
forecast error for the budget balance is regressed on a constant and on the growth 
forecast error for the pool of EU-15 countries. The results, segmented by the different 
forecast horizons, are shown in Table 1.  
As expected the impact of growth forecast errors on budgetary forecast errors 
is smaller for the current period, given that the SGPs are submitted at the end of the 
current year, resulting into a single quarter of GDP growth left to forecast. However, 
for the one-period-ahead to the three-periods-ahead there is a large impact of growth 
forecast errors: for each percentage point of deviation in the growth forecast, the 
actual budgetary balance is found to deviate by at least 0.5% of GDP from the level 
officially planned (with a maximum of 0.6% found for period t+2).14 Such values are in 
line with the usual sensitivity of the budget balance to the economic cycle, which is 
0.43 for the EU-15, according to the European Commission’s estimate. Pooling all 
forecast horizons leads to an estimate of 0.55%.15 16 
                                                     
12
 The usual assumption of an identically and independently distributed regression error εt is not 
plausible for forecasts at horizons greater than one, since even optimal forecasts in this setting would 
be expected to have errors that follow a moving-average process of order h – 1. Some forecast errors 
may also be non-normally distributed, which indicates conditional heteroskedasticity in the regression 
FE(2), resulting in over-sized tests if conventional t-tests are used. 
13
 This paper makes use of (raw) budget balances relative to GDP instead of cyclically adjusted balances, 
since the former are relevant for the evaluating the compliance with the 3% deficit ceiling set in the 
Treaty and receive much public attention, while the latter are dependent on the output gap estimation, 
deserve less public attention and are only explicitly taken into account since the 2005 reform of the 
Stability Pact.     
14
 The estimates are not free from serial correlated errors, however. 
15
 Those values compare with an estimate of 0.46 found by (Strauch, et al., 2009) for the period 1998-
2004, for the pooling of countries and forecast horizons. 
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Table 1– Impact of SGP growth forecast errors on the budgetary forecast errors– pool of EU-15 countries 
Time 
horizon 
 Dependent variable: SGP budgetary forecast errors 
egrowth  No. 
Degrees 
freedom 
F Test 
egrowth= 
0.547 
(p-value) 
LM test  
no AR2 
(p-value) 
 
F-test 
(p-value) 
R2 
t 0.246 ** 146 8.21 (0.0) 3.26 
(0.19) 
12.1 (0.0) 55.4% 
 (0.11)       
        
t+1 0.487 *** 132 0.739 (0.39) 10.39 
(0.0) 
7.5 (0.0) 46.0% 
 (0.07)       
        
t+2 0.605 *** 116 0.38 (0.53) 19.03 
(0.0) 
6.5 (0.0) 45.8% 
 (0.09)       
        
t+3 0.457 *** 100 0.457 (0.50) 34.51 
(0.0) 
4.3 (0.0) 39.1% 
 (0.13)       
        
Pooled 0.547 *** 497 - 67.6 (0.0) 5.7 (0.0) 40.6% 
 (0.05)       
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Estimation based 
on fixed effects by individual. The standard errors and the p-values for the tests are also 
presented in parenthesis. 
 
2. General descriptive statistics 
The empirical results of the general descriptive statistics for both the SGP and 
EC forecasts are shown in Table 3 to Table 6, in the Appendix. A negative mean error 
(ME) means that there is over-prediction (optimism), meaning that the forecast 
indicated a better output growth or a better budget balance (or a smaller deficit) than 
the actual outcome.  
For the current period the mean error of GDP growth forecasts in SGP are in 
general relatively small, and statistically not different from zero, denoting no forecast 
bias, except for Greece, France, and Portugal at the 10% significance level. Plus, no 
serial correlation up to order two is usually detected.  The RMSE is larger than the 
MAE, but the difference between the two measures is not great enough to point to 
large forecast errors, with the possible exception of the UK. These results are not 
surprising given that national SGPs are submitted near the end of the current year, 
already benefiting from the third quarter growth estimates, which reduces the 
forecasting exercise to just the current 4th quarter. The EC Autumn forecast for the 
                                                                                                                                                           
16
 Only the estimate for the current period is found to be statistically different from the estimate that 
pools all forecast horizons. 
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current year also exhibits small mean errors, with a statistically significant positive 
(under-prediction) bias for Greece, Spain, and Finland, countries that in fact 
performed better than forecasted. For the pool of EU-15 countries the mean error 
(0.02) in SGP growth forecasts is not statistically different from zero. However, in the 
case of the EC forecast there is a bias towards pessimistic growth forecasts for the 
pool of countries, at the 5% significance level, with the EC forecast having a mean 
error of 0.12. The RMSE of the EC growth forecast is however very similar to the SGPs’ 
forecasts. 
The SGP forecasts regarding the budget balance for the current period 
present a larger mean error (in absolute terms), but 10 EU countries present a cautious 
estimate for the budget developments in the year of presentation of the SGP update. 
Only Greece presents a statistically significant over-prediction bias for the budget 
balance. The pool of EU-15 countries presents a positive statistically mean error (0.38), 
confirming this cautious approach. A smaller (0.20) but still significant cautious bias is 
also present in the EC balance forecast for the pool of EU-15 countries.  
Regarding the one-year-ahead (t+1) SGP growth forecasts, the mean errors are 
in general negative, with Italy, Portugal and France presenting a statistically 
significant bias towards optimism. For the pool of EU-15 countries, the SGP forecasts 
present an optimistic bias (at the 10% significance level). The EC forecast in general 
performs better, showing some evidence towards over-prediction for Italy, and 
Portugal (at the 10% level), presenting nevertheless a smaller absolute mean error 
than the respective national government forecast. For mean errors for the budget 
balance variable of the SGP forecasts for 8 countries are found to be negative 
(optimistic forecast), but only for the case of Greece is this bias statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Of the 7 countries that under-predict the budget balance (pessimistic 
forecast) Luxembourg, Sweden, and Finland present a statistically significant and 
large mean error, that is also present in the EC forecast (albeit with a smaller mean 
error). The EC forecasts show a negative mean error for 6 countries. 
For the period t+2, 12 out of the 15 countries present a growth forecast larger 
than the outcomes in their respective SGPs, with Portugal, Italy, and France showing a 
large and statistically significant negative mean error. Ireland’s forecast presents a 
small mean error, but its RMSE indicates that large positive and negative errors cancel 
each other out over time. The EC forecast presents a negative mean error for all 
countries but Greece, and also a statistically significant optimistic bias for growth 
forecasts of Portugal, Italy, and France (albeit smaller than the respective national 
SGP forecasts). The forecasts for the pool of EU-15 countries show a statistically 
significant optimistic bias, showing a mean error of -0.45 in the case of SGP forecasts 
and a -0.6 mean error in the case of the EC forecasts. 
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With respect to the budget balance forecasts for the period t+2, a total of 8 of 
the 15 EU countries show a negative mean error in their national SGPs, with such 
optimistic bias being statistically significant for Greece, France, Italy, Portugal. On the 
other hand, Finland, and to a lesser extent Luxembourg present a pessimistic 
statistically significant bias. The pool of EU-15 countries has a mean error of -0.18, 
which is not statistically different from zero. The EC forecast is unbiased, presenting a 
negative mean error for 7 countries and a positive mean error for the other 8.17 For the 
pool of EU-15 countries there is a null mean error in the EC forecast. 
For the period t+3 there are no EC forecasts. SGPs growth forecasts for all 
countries but Finland present a negative mean error, with France, Italy, and Portugal 
having a statistically significant optimistic bias (at the 1% level), with Portugal and 
Italy showing the largest absolute deviation (-2.3, and -1.9, respectively). The pool of 
EU-15 countries shows a statistically significant mean error of -0.75. The SGPs’ budget 
balance forecasts for the 3-years-ahead horizon present a negative mean error 
(optimistic forecasts) in 9 countries, of which 5 are statistically significant (Greece, 
France, Italy, Portugal, and the UK). These countries show very large (absolute) mean 
errors for their budget balances: -3.6% of GDP in Greece; -2.3% in Portugal; -2.11% in 
Italy; and -1.78% of GDP in France. Such large deviations, very close to the reference 
level for the deficit, reveal the difficulties those countries are experiencing in 
effectively attaining their fiscal goals over a medium-term horizon, presenting fiscal 
plans for the longer horizon which are clearly optimistic. For the pool of EU-15 
countries the mean error is -0.77% of GDP, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
Next, following the approach of (Artis and Marcellino, 2001), we have 
computed a simple measure to select which forecast performs better in terms of 
the general descriptive statistics, selecting the forecast that had the largest number 
of smaller values in terms of absolute mean error, MAE and RMSE. For instance, for a 
given country if the SGP forecasts indicate the smaller MAE and the smaller RMSE, it 
is the selected ‘winner’. This simple procedure selects the EC forecast as the better 
output growth forecast for the period t+1 in 73% of the 15 EU countries (the EC 
forecast also performs better for the pool of countries). The percentage decreases to 
67% for the current period, and to just 47% for the period t+2. Hence, there seems to 
be room for improving the accuracy of the EC growth forecast for its longer horizon 
(t+2). With regard to the budget balance, the EC forecast performs better than SGPs 
forecasts for 47%, 67% and 60% of the countries for the periods, t, t+1, and t+2, 
respectively, using this simple criterion. Furthermore, the EC forecast is found to 
                                                     
17
 There is only some evidence pointing to a bias in the EC forecast for Greece and Luxembourg at the 
10% significance level. 
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perform better for the budget balance, for all forecasting horizons, for the pool of EU-
15 countries. 
3. Formal comparison of competing forecasts 
The next step was the modified Diebold-Mariano (mDM) test for the equality 
of forecasts (Table 8 to Table 10). Given the very small sample at the country level, 
the test results should be read with extreme care since, as previously argued, they 
could be over-sized. The null of equality versus different forecasts is tested for first. 
Overall, the results point to the forecasts being equal, with a slight preponderance of 
better results for the EC forecasts for the year-ahead horizon. 
The final step was the computation of the forecasting encompassing tests 
FE(1), FE(2), and FE(3). As before, a simple measure was used to select as the ‘winning 
forecast’ the one that is chosen by more of the 6 tests involved. A tie between national 
and EC forecasts is dominant for all forecast horizons. Yet, for the pool of EU-15 
countries the EC forecast is a clear winner for all forecast horizons, and for both 
variables, except for the current period growth forecast. This finding is consistent with 
(Artis and Marcellino, 2001), who concluded for a general advantage of the EC budget 
balance forecasts (in  forecast encompassing tests), whose forecast errors could not 
be explained by other forecasts made by international organizations.18 Also (Strauch, 
et al., 2009) concluded that the information content of EC forecasts encompasses 
national programmes projections, which the authors found to be a counter-intuitive 
result, since the information set available to the European Commission is a subset of 
the information available to the national governments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18
 The authors did not make a comparison with national official forecasts. 
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4. Summary of the differences in the forecasting accuracy of 
competing forecasts at the country level 
With regard to forecasting accuracy, the previous description showed that 
there are considerable differences at the country level, and at different forecast 
horizons, which call for some caution in the use of (over-)pooled samples, i.e. samples 
pooled over countries and over time periods, as done in some of the previous 
literature.19  
Table 2 summarizes the combination of countries/forecast horizon for which 
the EC forecast is found to perform better in terms of the general descriptive statistics 
(mean error, MAE & RMSE), and to encompass the SGP forecast or tie with it, using 
the forecast encompassing tests FE(1) to FE(3). For GDP growth forecasts the EC 
forecast is found to outperform the respective SGP forecasts for all forecast horizons 
for France, Italy, and Portugal. For the period ahead (t+1) the EC forecast is found to 
be better than official forecasts for Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, the UK, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and for the pool of EU-15 countries, in addition to the 
previously mentioned countries (i.e. for a total of 11 countries). This is a relevant 
conclusion for the forecast accuracy of the EC Autumn forecasts, since the year-ahead 
horizon is probably the most important time horizon in the budget process, because 
this is the period for which corrective action could be immediately taken to correct 
any deviation of fiscal outcomes from the medium-term fiscal plans. As (Beetsma, et 
al., 2009) put it, plans in the annual budget law contribute more to any observed fiscal 
adjustment than medium-term fiscal projections that lack a clear legal status.20 
 
                                                     
19
 (Strauch, et al., 2009) argue that looking at country performance for each projection horizon would 
have drastically reduced the number of observations and therefore might not lead to reasonable 
results. According to the authors “Since the projection horizon is standardized to three years ahead 
according to the stipulations of the Stability and Growth Pact and censoring of data at the end of the 
sample period affects all countries similarly, we should not incur any systematic mistakes when pooling 
observations over projection horizons.” 
20
 Contrary to (Beetsma, et al., 2009), and other literature, this paper does not try to find out the 
determinants of the differences between fiscal plans and fiscal outcomes and relate these differences 
to institutional variables. Instead it has focused on the issue of the impact of growth forecast bias on 
fiscal outcomes. 
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Table 2 – Countries for which EC forecast performs better in terms of general descriptive statistics 
and encompasses or ties with SGP forecasts (FE-OLS tests) 
 Forecast made in period t for period: 
Variable t, t+1, t+2 t t, t+2 t, t+1 t+1 t+1, t+2 
GDP growth FR, IT, PT DK FI 
DE, NL, 
SE 
ES, UK, 
Pool 
EL, IE, LU 
Budget Balance 
BE, DK, FR, IT, 
Pool 
UK IE DE LU, FI EL, PT, SE 
Notes: If consideration was given only to the general descriptive statistics, disregarding forecast 
encompassing tests, the above table would also include Germany for the budget balance variable for 
t+2; and Spain for the GDP growth variable for period t. 
 
With regard to the budget balance, the EC forecast is found to outperform for 
all forecast horizons for the Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and the pool of EU-15 
countries. For the period ahead horizon (t+1), in addition to the previous countries, the 
EC forecast is also found to perform better than the respective SGP forecasts for 
Germany, Luxembourg, Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden (i.e. for a total of 10 
countries). 
This result is in line with (ECB, 2004) findings. Using data from the SGPs 
submitted between 1999 and 2003, the (ECB, 2004) concluded that only around half of 
the EU Member states have had no significant bias in their budget forecasts. 
Furthermore, the ECB pointed out that in contrast, countries with deficits close to or 
above the 3% of GDP reference value generally offered considerably more optimistic 
budget forecasts than other countries. Greece, Portugal, France, Germany, and Italy 
were found to have the largest optimistic forecast biases, with a deviation for the 
deficit greater than 1 ¼% of GDP. 
 
5. Extension to the case of the IMF’s forecasts 
Next, the IMF’s forecasts were taken as a benchmark. The IMF releases two 
regular forecast exercises during the year, and their forecast horizon covers the 
current period and the year ahead. In order to enable the comparison with SGP 
forecasts we took the IMF Autumn (October) forecast, which is closest in time to the 
presentation of national SGP forecasts. The sample covers the forecasts made from 
1998 to 2007.21 
                                                     
21
 Contrary to the previous sections, where the sample for the current period horizon covers the period 
1998-2008, here the IMF’s current year forecasts made in October 2008 for the year of 2008 is not 
considered, since SGP forecasts for 2008 were only released in January 2009. Although the IMF has also 
produced an interim forecast update in January 2009, it was only for a few large countries. 
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The Table 7 in the Appendix has the results for the descriptive statistics of the 
IMF forecast errors. The IMF forecasts for the current year, for both the GDP growth 
and the budget balance, generally show a positive mean error, meaning that they 
tend to be pessimistic. A statistically significant positive mean error for the case of 
GDP growth forecasts is found for Ireland, Greece, Spain, Finland, and for the pool of 
countries. A pessimistic budget balance forecast for the current year is found for the 
pool of countries and for Luxembourg, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. On the 
other hand, a statistically significant bias towards optimism is found for Greece. 
For the year-ahead growth forecast, only for Italy was there a statistically 
significant bias at the 5% level (for optimism). For the pool of 15 countries the mean 
error is -0.23, but is not statistically different from zero.22 Yet, for the budget balance 
forecast, a statistically significant bias is found at the 5% level for Luxembourg, 
Finland, Sweden, and Austria on the pessimistic side, and for Greece a large error (-
1.68) on the optimistic side. It should be said in relation to this that the mean error of 
the IMF budget balance forecast for the year-ahead period is very close to the 
corresponding mean error of the national SGP forecast.  
The IMF budget balance forecasts are based on officially announced budgets, 
adjusted for differences between the national authorities and the IMF staff regarding 
macroeconomic assumptions and projected fiscal outcomes.23 The results show that 
the methodology used by the IMF was not able to filter out optimistic national 
government budget forecasts.24 The EC forecasts, on the contrary, are based wholly 
on staff projections, fully incorporating the EC own growth forecasts and benefiting 
from a closer knowledge of fiscal developments in EU countries. This is largely due to 
its supervisory role of fiscal policies under the Stability and Growth Pact, factors which 
probably explain its better track record. 
Re-computing the simple measure to select which of the forecasts performs 
better in terms of the general descriptive statistics, it can be concluded that the 
addition of the IMF forecast does not greatly change the previous results: the IMF 
forecast is just selected as the best forecast for the current year’s growth for Portugal, 
                                                     
22
 The IMF forecast for the deficit for the pool of countries presents serial correlation problem of order 
two. 
23
 See the latest IMF World Economic Outlook, of October 2009, which also adds that “The medium-
term fiscal projections incorporate policy measures that are judged likely to be implemented. In cases 
where the IMF staff has insufficient information to assess the authorities’ budget intentions and 
prospects for policy implementation, an unchanged structural primary balance is assumed, unless 
otherwise indicated.” 
24
 The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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and for the year-ahead growth for Ireland and Sweden (replacing the EC forecast).25 In 
relation to the budget balance forecast, the IMF forecast is only selected for Belgium, 
and just for the current period. 
Overall, the forecasts produced by the two international organizations for the 
year-ahead horizon perform better in terms of presenting a smaller absolute mean 
error in ⅔ of the cases than national SGP forecasts. 
With regard to the formal tests of forecast encompassing, as before, a tie is 
dominant between the IMF and the SGP forecasts, and between the IMF and the EC 
forecast.26 As before, such results should be read with care, since the small number of 
observations might explain the inability of the tests to discriminate between the 
different forecasts. 
 
II. Policy implications and conclusions 
The present high public debt levels recorded in the EU, at a time of increased 
spending pressures caused by ageing populations, will require credible fiscal plans that 
aim at restoring fiscal sustainability. The use of unbiased growth forecasts is a crucial 
element to enhancing the credibility of the medium-term fiscal plans. If official GDP 
growth forecasts are biased towards optimism, governments may appear to be 
planning more stringent fiscal objectives than is actually the case. (Jonung and Larch, 
2006) concluded that “optimistic growth projections supported adequate deficit 
targets in the planning phase of the budget and downplayed the need for fiscal 
consolidation, while the worse-than-expected outcome ex-post was attributed to 
circumstances beyond the control of the government.”27 Hence, getting GDP forecasts 
right will be quite important to bring down the debt levels.  
This paper shows that for EU-15 economies a 1% deviation of actual output 
growth from the national officially forecasted value, leads to a deviation of the budget 
balance from planned of at least 0.5% of GDP (0.6% of GDP for two-period-ahead 
fiscal plans). 
                                                     
25
 As a result of the reduction of the sample for the current year period up to 2007, the national SGP 
growth forecasts are found to be better than the EC forecast for Finland, Sweden, and the UK. The 
same happens with France for the current year budget balance forecast. 
26
 These results are not shown due to space constraints, but are available upon request. 
27
 Still according to the authors, “a rosy medium-term outlook underpinning budgetary projections has 
served as a means to avoid or postpone the adoption of comprehensive reforms and politically costly 
reforms.” 
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(Jonung and Larch, 2006) argued for the preparation of growth forecasts for 
the budget process at the national level to be delegated to independent national 
authorities. This paper, however, investigates whether the use of supra-national 
growth forecasts instead of those of the national governments would reduce the 
optimistic bias. This required a detailed comparative analysis of the accuracy of the 
national governments’ growth (and budget balances) forecasts with those made by 
the European Commission and the IMF. The analysis considered three different 
forecast horizons (current period, one-year-ahead, two-years-ahead, and three-years-
ahead) for the period 1998-2008. A direct comparison is made with the competing 
European Commission’s forecasts (up to the two-years-ahead forecast horizon). A 
comparison is also made with IMF forecasts.  
The evidence on the relative performance of the EC growth forecast is rather 
mixed. The use of the formal modified Diebold-Mariano (mDM) test for the equality of 
forecasts generally points to the equality of the predictive power of both forecasts, 
with a slight preponderance of better results for the EC forecasts for the year-ahead 
horizon. Yet, for the pool of EU-15 countries, the EC forecast is a clear winner for all 
forecast horizons, except for the current period growth forecast. A simple summary of 
the results of 3 variants of forecast encompassing tests provides further evidence for 
equal predictive power (at the disaggregated country level). However, given the small 
sample size at the country level, the results of these formal statistical tests should be 
read with care. And so, resorting to a simple summary based on the descriptive 
statistics of forecasting accuracy (mean error, mean absolute error, and root mean 
squared error), it is possible to conclude that the accuracy of EC forecasts is not 
uniform across countries or forecast horizons. Nevertheless, different patterns 
emerge at the country level: for France, Italy, and Portugal the EC growth forecast is 
found to perform better than their national forecasts, for all forecast horizons.  
Taking into account all the previously mentioned tests’ conclusions together, 
for the one-year-ahead horizon the EC growth forecast is found to be better than 
official forecasts for almost ¾ of the EU-15 countries (France, Italy, Portugal Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, the UK, Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg), and also for 
the pool of EU-15 countries. This is a relevant conclusion, since the period-ahead 
horizon is probably the most important time horizon for the budget process, because 
corrective action can be taken immediately to avoid any deviation of fiscal outcomes 
from the medium-term fiscal plans. For the current period the “success” rate of the EC 
forecast falls to 67%, and is further reduced to just 47% when the two-years-ahead 
horizon is considered, which signals room for improvement in the accuracy of the EC 
forecast for its longer horizon (t+2). Nevertheless, the EC forecast appears to be a 
good benchmark for all forecast horizons.  
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All in all, at the disaggregated country/forecast-horizon level there is just some 
weak evidence supporting the view that in order to reduce the forecast bias national 
governments should use the EC forecasts when preparing their SGPs. But there is 
evidence supporting the view that countries could be forced to justify any large 
(optimistic) deviation from the EC forecasts, which would serve as benchmark.  
On the same line of reasoning, the time span of the EC macroeconomic 
forecasts/projections could also be extended to cover at least one more year: the EC 
forecasts only cover up to the 2-years-ahead horizon, while SGP updates should 
present macroeconomic forecasts, and fiscal goals for the next three years. The 
practice by 9 member countries of successively postponing the goal of attaining their 
respective medium term objectives, revealed by the presence of negative mean errors 
in their national forecasts for the budget balance for the longer horizon, means that 
the lack of a European Commission forecast for such 3-years-ahead forecast horizon is 
quite costly. Hence, the Commission should at least provide some guidelines, since 
this omission makes it harder for the (general) public, and for the Commission itself, 
to assess the degree of realism of the national governments’ fiscal plans for the longer 
SGP forecast-horizon. 
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Appendix 
A. General statistics 
 
Table 3 – Forecast errors for current period 
Country Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2) Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2)
BE 10 0.08 0.20 0.23 0.05 11 0.09 0.25 0.36 0.00 SGP
DK 11 0.05 0.55 0.66 0.61 11 0.07 0.35 0.37 0.79 EC
DE 11 -0.01 0.27 0.36 0.33 11 -0.06 0.19 0.27 0.86 EC
EL 11 0.14 * 0.19 0.25 0.85 11 0.25 ** 0.26 0.37 0.83 SGP
ES 11 0.08 0.19 0.23 0.13 11 0.14 ** 0.15 0.22 0.80 EC
FR 11 -0.15 * 0.20 0.27 0.30 11 0.04 0.22 0.25 0.06 EC
IE 11 0.46 1.08 1.20 0.13 11 0.64 1.42 1.72 0.40 SGP
IT 11 0.01 0.30 0.44 0.89 11 -0.09 0.18 0.24 0.95 EC
LU 11 0.06 1.21 1.52 0.13 11 0.35 1.28 1.58 0.37 SGP
NL 11 -0.27 0.70 1.02 0.86 11 0.19 0.39 0.55 0.82 EC
AT 10 -0.04 0.34 0.39 0.67 11 0.09 0.36 0.42 0.57 SGP
PT 11 -0.17 * 0.25 0.30 0.53 11 -0.11 0.22 0.30 0.02 EC
FI 11 0.19 0.50 0.67 0.54 11 0.38 ** 0.49 0.58 0.62 EC
SE 11 -0.22 0.40 0.59 0.09 11 -0.14 0.32 0.38 0.50 EC
UK 11 0.11 0.17 0.31 0.95 11 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.59 EC
Pool 163 0.02 0.44 0.68 0.00 165 0.12 ** 0.42 0.69 0.07 SGP
BE 10 -0.07 0.41 0.77 0.88 11 -0.04 0.44 0.75 0.80 EC
DK 10 3.35 *** 3.35 3.66 0.23 11 0.62 ** 0.80 1.04 0.44 EC
DE 11 0.33 0.44 0.74 0.71 11 0.24 * 0.38 0.46 0.30 EC
EL 11 -0.79 ** 0.81 1.19 0.60 11 -0.82 ** 0.87 1.22 0.78 SGP
ES 11 0.09 0.27 0.34 0.66 11 0.19 0.34 0.41 0.74 SGP
FR 11 -0.05 0.19 0.24 0.45 11 0.05 0.17 0.21 0.99 EC
IE 11 -0.34 0.85 1.63 0.95 11 -0.22 1.16 1.55 0.99 EC
IT 11 0.07 0.40 0.54 0.77 11 0.04 0.31 0.41 0.73 EC
LU 11 1.65 *** 1.65 1.89 0.34 11 1.62 *** 1.76 2.08 0.66 SGP
NL 11 0.38 0.76 0.85 0.48 11 0.30 0.79 0.89 0.16 SGP
AT 10 0.16 * 0.26 0.28 0.66 11 0.29 * 0.36 0.55 0.80 SGP
PT 10 -0.11 0.37 0.67 0.93 11 -0.05 0.55 0.79 0.83 SGP
FI 11 0.43 0.68 0.94 0.12 11 0.39 0.79 1.08 0.15 SGP
SE 11 0.46 ** 0.59 0.72 0.42 11 0.55 ** 0.62 0.81 0.45 SGP
UK 11 0.41 0.59 1.07 0.30 11 -0.15 0.38 0.46 0.27 EC
Pool 162 0.38 *** 0.77 1.31 0.00 165 0.20 *** 0.65 0.97 0.01 EC
GDP growth
Budget balance
ME ME
"Winner"
EC autumn forecastSGP forecast
 
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance of the mean error at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. ME stands for 
mean error of the forecast; MAE for mean absolute error; and RMSE for root mean square error. “Pv no AR(2)” 
stands for p-value of the LM test (F-variant) for the null of no serial correlation up to order 2. The “Winner” 
column depicts the forecast that performs better in terms of smaller absolute ME, smaller MAE, and smaller 
RMSE (the forecast that performs better in the larger number of criteria is selected). 
Key: BE –Belgium; DK –Denmark; DE – Germany; EL –Greece; ES –Spain; FR –France; IE –Ireland; IT –Italy; LU 
–Luxembourg; NL –Netherlands; AT –Austria; PT –Portugal; FI –Finland; SE –Sweden; UK –The United 
Kingdom. 
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Table 4 – Forecast errors for period t+1 
Country Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2) Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2)
BE 9 -0.17 0.99 1.08 0.72 10 -0.26 0.96 1.14 0.39 SGP
DK 10 -0.15 0.93 1.18 0.85 10 -0.24 0.98 1.19 0.85 SGP
DE 10 -0.38 1.00 1.15 0.94 10 -0.28 0.96 1.16 0.91 EC
EL 10 0.08 0.54 0.63 0.92 10 0.21 0.49 0.55 0.81 EC
ES 10 -0.15 0.59 0.76 0.65 10 0.03 0.57 0.76 0.73 EC
FR 10 -0.68 * 0.92 1.13 0.60 10 -0.42 0.68 0.85 0.21 EC
IE 10 0.52 2.20 2.76 0.37 10 0.41 2.17 2.82 0.45 EC
IT 10 -1.01 ** 1.27 1.48 0.57 10 -0.74 ** 0.98 1.20 0.45 EC
LU 10 0.30 3.02 3.47 0.19 10 0.15 2.71 3.27 0.44 EC
NL 10 -0.22 1.09 1.35 0.64 10 -0.23 1.07 1.29 0.96 EC
AT 9 -0.14 0.70 0.95 0.75 10 -0.17 0.73 0.97 0.79 SGP
PT 10 -0.96 ** 1.08 1.41 0.57 10 -0.75 * 0.99 1.26 0.67 EC
FI 10 -0.01 1.35 1.69 0.62 10 -0.03 1.41 1.71 0.53 SGP
SE 10 -0.31 1.29 1.58 0.82 10 -0.34 1.14 1.50 0.83 EC
UK 10 -0.12 0.65 0.76 0.68 10 -0.20 0.64 0.76 0.20 EC
Pool 148 -0.23 * 1.18 1.61 0.07 150 -0.19 1.10 1.54 0.03 EC
BE 9 -0.24 0.71 0.98 0.81 10 0.02 0.64 0.81 0.43 EC
DK 10 0.89 * 1.27 1.66 0.39 10 0.59 0.99 1.42 0.56 EC
DE 10 0.22 1.07 1.27 0.68 10 0.43 0.99 1.25 0.86 EC
EL 10 -1.83 ** 1.93 2.55 0.23 10 -1.37 ** 1.79 2.20 0.08 EC
ES 10 -0.04 1.00 1.71 0.39 10 0.06 1.14 1.78 0.20 SGP
FR 10 -0.39 0.63 0.84 0.08 10 -0.26 0.66 0.81 0.59 EC
IE 10 -0.45 2.19 2.74 0.96 10 -0.97 2.37 2.89 0.93 SGP
IT 10 -0.54 1.04 1.14 0.39 10 -0.14 0.76 0.89 0.21 EC
LU 10 2.01 *** 2.09 2.53 0.71 10 2.00 *** 2.08 2.39 0.42 EC
NL 10 0.63 1.44 1.72 0.08 10 0.60 1.52 1.76 0.07 SGP
AT 9 0.21 0.34 0.41 0.82 10 0.48 ** 0.56 0.70 0.89 SGP
PT 10 -0.61 0.97 1.48 0.55 10 -0.35 0.93 1.31 0.67 EC
FI 10 0.96 ** 1.14 1.42 0.93 10 0.92 ** 1.08 1.43 0.99 EC
SE 10 1.04 ** 1.50 1.63 0.26 10 0.85 ** 1.15 1.33 0.05 EC
UK 10 -0.01 1.17 1.70 0.64 10 -0.40 1.38 1.66 0.51 SGP
Pool 148 0.13 1.24 1.71 0.00 150 0.16 1.20 1.63 0.00 EC
GDP growth
Budget balance
EC autumn forecast
"Winner"
ME ME
SGP forecast
 
Notes: see Table 3. 
 
24 
 
Table 5 – Forecast errors for period t+2 
Country Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2) Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2)
BE 8 -0.81 * 1.09 1.26 0.98 9 -0.69 1.18 1.38 0.36 SGP
DK 9 0.09 1.13 1.31 0.94 9 -0.46 1.19 1.51 0.58 SGP
DE 9 -0.54 1.35 1.52 0.55 9 -0.82 1.38 1.63 0.32 SGP
EL 9 0.03 0.66 0.81 0.53 9 0.23 0.63 0.70 0.64 EC
ES 9 -0.18 0.80 0.97 0.20 9 -0.26 0.86 1.03 0.17 SGP
FR 9 -0.83 ** 0.97 1.18 0.59 9 -0.87 ** 0.93 1.15 0.90 EC
IE 9 -0.16 2.02 3.00 0.69 9 -0.51 1.58 2.48 0.78 EC
IT 9 -1.42 *** 1.44 1.80 0.40 9 -1.14 ** 1.28 1.58 0.50 EC
LU 9 -0.46 3.12 3.61 0.40 9 -0.68 3.06 3.51 0.21 EC
NL 9 -0.34 1.08 1.34 0.80 9 -0.96 1.44 1.93 0.28 SGP
AT 8 -0.20 0.78 0.88 0.80 9 -0.41 0.86 1.06 0.51 SGP
PT 9 -1.72 *** 1.79 2.10 0.83 9 -1.40 *** 1.56 1.79 0.88 EC
FI 9 0.31 1.67 1.87 0.74 9 -0.08 1.61 1.90 0.50 EC
SE 9 -0.19 1.06 1.42 0.84 9 -0.46 1.17 1.48 0.69 SGP
UK 9 -0.40 0.56 0.80 0.08 9 -0.54 0.88 1.04 0.64 SGP
Pool 133 -0.45 *** 1.31 1.78 0.01 135 -0.60 *** 1.31 1.74 0.00 SGP
BE 8 -0.43 0.80 1.11 0.72 9 -0.02 0.78 0.92 0.44 EC
DK 9 0.96 1.58 1.94 0.16 9 0.52 1.39 1.70 0.13 EC
DE 9 -0.24 1.98 2.13 0.02 9 0.22 1.80 2.03 0.10 EC
EL 9 -2.62 ** 2.84 3.53 0.22 9 -1.81 * 2.17 2.94 0.03 EC
ES 9 0.07 1.16 1.78 0.26 9 0.24 1.36 1.95 0.32 SGP
FR 9 -1.00 ** 1.13 1.55 0.06 9 -0.52 1.14 1.41 0.13 EC
IE 9 -0.61 2.79 3.50 0.96 9 -1.48 2.57 3.36 0.95 EC
IT 9 -1.23 ** 1.77 1.91 0.70 9 -0.03 1.17 1.41 0.86 EC
LU 9 1.73 * 2.38 2.84 0.13 9 1.97 * 2.77 3.12 0.26 SGP
NL 8 0.24 1.66 1.91 0.11 9 0.16 2.16 2.50 0.01 SGP
AT 8 0.00 0.40 0.50 0.07 9 0.37 0.99 1.21 0.81 SGP
PT 9 -1.33 ** 1.58 1.97 0.61 9 -0.49 1.33 1.61 0.49 EC
FI 9 1.44 ** 1.49 2.16 0.35 9 1.17 1.63 2.19 0.52 SGP
SE 9 0.98 1.84 2.02 0.29 9 0.69 1.67 1.92 0.65 EC
UK 9 -0.53 1.67 2.20 0.76 9 -1.04 2.09 2.60 0.19 SGP
Pool 132 -0.18 1.69 2.22 0.00 135 0.00 1.67 2.17 0.00 EC
Budget balance
ME ME
GDP growth
SGP forecast EC autumn forecast
"Winner"
 
Notes: see Table 3. 
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Table 6 – Forecast errors for period t+3 
Country Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2) Nobs MAE RMSE Pv no AR(2)
BE 7 -0.60 0.91 1.05 0.73 7 -0.69 0.91 1.26 0.65
DK 8 -0.28 1.05 1.33 0.33 8 1.14 1.81 2.09 0.42
DE 8 -0.89 * 1.18 1.36 0.62 8 -1.11 2.14 2.36 0.01
EL 8 -0.11 0.66 0.74 0.89 8 -3.56 *** 3.56 4.39 0.03
ES 8 -0.30 0.85 1.01 0.36 8 0.04 1.19 1.82 0.41
FR 8 -1.04 *** 1.04 1.27 0.82 8 -1.78 *** 1.83 2.19 0.10
IE 8 -0.86 1.64 2.69 0.61 8 -1.30 2.58 3.18 0.87
IT 8 -1.90 *** 1.90 2.10 0.77 8 -2.11 *** 2.11 2.49 0.31
LU 8 -1.45 2.48 2.91 0.00 8 0.79 2.71 3.13 0.23
NL 8 -0.67 1.04 1.34 0.71 7 0.06 1.86 2.07 0.13
AT 7 -0.40 0.89 0.97 0.99 7 -0.13 0.73 0.92 0.51
PT 8 -2.30 *** 2.30 2.53 0.88 8 -2.30 *** 2.30 2.68 0.48
FI 8 0.18 1.30 1.54 0.96 8 0.91 1.69 2.03 0.09
SE 7 -0.14 1.11 1.36 0.80 7 0.30 1.64 1.93 0.71
UK 8 -0.38 0.75 0.96 0.28 8 -1.45 ** 1.65 1.92 0.51
Pool 117 -0.75 *** 1.28 1.69 0.01 116 -0.77 *** 1.94 2.46 0.00
ME ME
Budget balance (SGP)
GDP growth
GDP growth (SGP)
 
Notes: see Table 3. 
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Table 7 – Forecast errors for IMF forecast 
Horizon:
Country Nobs MAE RMSE
Pv no 
AR(2)
"Winner" Nobs MAE RMSE
Pv no 
AR(2)
"Winner"
BE 10 -0.38 0.88 1.76 0.90 SGP 10 -0.25 1.01 1.15 0.71 SGP
DK 10 0.26 0.52 0.61 0.77 EC 10 -0.22 1.02 1.28 0.90 SGP
DE 10 0.00 0.28 0.37 0.39 EC 10 -0.54 1.24 1.45 0.84 EC
EL 10 0.38 *** 0.42 0.50 0.91 SGP 10 0.47 0.65 0.78 0.73 EC
ES 10 0.24 ** 0.24 0.33 0.97 EC 10 0.02 0.68 0.76 0.32 EC
FR 10 -0.08 0.24 0.28 0.38 EC 10 -0.62 0.76 1.00 0.65 EC
IE 10 1.22 ** 1.40 1.81 0.68 SGP 10 0.36 1.98 2.56 0.64 IMF
IT 10 -0.12 0.24 0.33 0.83 EC 10 -0.92 ** 1.16 1.36 0.66 EC
LU 10 1.06 2.02 2.42 0.33 SGP 10 0.02 2.88 3.30 0.46 EC
NL 10 0.25 0.49 0.62 0.97 EC 10 -0.40 1.16 1.44 0.83 EC
AT 10 0.13 0.45 0.54 0.89 SGP 10 -0.25 0.95 1.10 0.98 SGP
PT 10 -0.11 0.17 0.27 0.54 IMF 10 -0.98 * 1.12 1.40 0.86 EC
FI 10 0.56 ** 0.82 0.91 0.90 SGP 10 0.06 1.44 1.70 0.90 SGP
SE 10 -0.05 0.45 0.52 0.98 SGP 10 -0.19 1.15 1.43 0.93 IMF
UK 10 0.10 0.24 0.40 0.36 SGP 10 -0.07 0.71 0.80 0.41 EC
Pool 150 0.23 *** 0.59 1.01 0.07 SGP 150 -0.23 1.19 1.58 0.75 EC
BE 10 0.12 0.44 0.60 0.84 IMF 9 0.21 0.88 1.15 0.37 EC
DK 10 0.77 * 1.07 1.45 0.31 EC 10 0.95 1.39 1.78 0.23 EC
DE 10 0.21 0.53 0.65 0.25 EC 10 0.33 1.31 1.54 0.56 EC
EL 10 -1.21 ** 1.27 1.72 0.16 SGP 10 -1.68 ** 2.16 2.82 0.03 EC
ES 9 0.43 *** 0.46 0.52 0.20 SGP 8 0.13 1.28 1.84 0.86 SGP
FR 10 -0.04 0.36 0.41 0.65 SGP 10 -0.40 0.86 1.10 0.69 EC
IE 10 -0.01 1.27 1.61 0.73 Tie 10 -0.51 2.17 2.86 0.98 SGP
IT 10 0.06 0.46 0.53 0.50 EC 10 -0.10 1.08 1.24 0.43 EC
LU 10 2.00 *** 2.00 2.24 0.08 SGP 10 2.02 *** 2.74 3.14 0.58 EC
NL 10 0.58 1.04 1.15 0.08 SGP 10 0.76 1.72 2.00 0.03 SGP
AT 10 0.31 ** 0.43 0.48 0.35 SGP 9 0.37 ** 0.57 0.73 0.20 SGP
PT 10 0.29 0.83 0.99 0.87 SGP 10 -0.21 0.97 1.33 0.74 EC
FI 10 0.68 ** 0.98 1.10 0.52 SGP 10 1.15 ** 1.15 1.49 0.43 EC
SE 10 0.87 ** 1.01 1.25 0.40 SGP 10 0.96 ** 1.48 1.67 0.10 EC
UK 10 0.11 0.53 0.71 0.16 EC 10 -0.10 1.52 2.12 0.43 SGP
Pool 150 0.34 *** 0.84 1.15 0.00 EC 150 0.25 1.40 1.90 0.00 EC
Budget balance
ME ME
GDP growth
Current year Year-ahead
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B. Forecast encompassing tests 
Table 8 – Forecast encompassing tests for current period 
SGP EC Concl. SGP EC SGP EC SGP EC
BE 0.15 0.07 0.93 = 0.24 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.22 0.32 SGP
DK 0.01 0.99 0.01 EC 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.15 EC
DE 0.03 0.98 0.02 EC 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.29 0.97 0.40 EC
EL 0.04 0.02 0.98 SGP 0.60 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.01 SGP
ES 0.66 0.67 0.33 = 0.07 0.86 0.23 0.50 0.21 0.04 SGP
FR 0.72 0.64 0.36 = 0.80 0.38 0.08 0.22 0.17 0.93 Tie
IE 0.09 0.04 0.96 SGP (?) 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.36 0.46 SGP
IT 0.23 0.89 0.11 = 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.88 0.49 0.59 EC
LU 0.27 0.14 0.86 = 0.65 0.62 0.82 0.37 0.75 0.34 Tie
NL 0.22 0.89 0.11 = 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.93 0.69 0.69 EC
AT 0.44 0.78 0.22 = 0.31 0.58 0.51 0.88 0.44 0.71 Tie
PT 0.73 0.64 0.36 = 0.74 0.18 0.32 0.41 0.14 0.46 Tie
FI 0.65 0.68 0.32 = 0.01 0.47 0.09 0.70 0.28 0.04 Tie
SE 0.29 0.86 0.14 = 0.02 0.55 0.00 0.46 0.69 0.28 EC
UK 0.65 0.67 0.33 = 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.75 0.81 Tie
Pool 0.89 0.44 0.56 = 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.01 0.00 Tie
BE 0.70 0.35 0.65 = 0.49 0.35 0.86 0.63 0.60 0.96 Tie
DK 0.01 1.00 0.00 EC 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.82 EC
DE 0.41 0.80 0.20 = 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.28 0.79 0.02 EC
EL 0.73 0.36 0.64 = 0.88 0.62 0.91 0.48 0.08 0.03 SGP
ES 0.02 0.01 0.99 SGP 0.12 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.08 0.11 SGP
FR 0.65 0.68 0.32 = 0.19 0.91 0.11 0.65 0.43 0.54 Tie
IE 0.74 0.63 0.37 = 0.34 0.67 0.26 0.62 0.95 0.73 Tie
IT 0.13 0.93 0.07 = 0.02 0.62 0.02 0.79 0.72 0.41 EC
LU 0.73 0.36 0.64 = 0.13 0.01 0.42 0.11 0.10 0.20 SGP
NL 0.75 0.37 0.63 = 0.90 0.35 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 Tie
AT 0.23 0.12 0.88 = 0.75 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.12 0.39 SGP
PT 0.10 0.05 0.95 = 0.70 0.22 0.51 0.07 0.99 0.95 Tie
FI 0.22 0.11 0.89 = 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.20 SGP
SE 0.26 0.13 0.87 = 0.48 0.17 0.75 0.13 0.08 0.04 SGP
UK 0.30 0.85 0.15 = 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.04 Tie
Pool 0.30 0.85 0.15 = 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.45 0.05 0.09 EC
GDP growth
Budget balance
FE(3)
better forecast:Country
FE 
overall 
"winner"
P-value mDM test for:
better forecast:
Equality
better forecast:
FE(1) FE(2)
better forecast:
 
Notes: P-values for the tests. “=” means that the modified Diebold-Mariano (mDM) null of the test 
for equality of forecasts is not rejected; “EC” or “SGP” denote which forecast is found to perform 
better. In column (5) the ‘(?)’ is added to the outcome of the test for the null of equal forecasts versus 
one forecast being better than the other, if this test result is conflicting with the test in column (2) 
[null of equality versus different forecasts]. The last column selects an overall “winner” in forecast 
encompassing tests FE(1) to FE(3), computed as the forecast that is selected in a larger number of 
the 6 tests. “Tie” denotes that both forecasts are selected in the same number of tests. FE(1)-FE(3) 
tests are based on OLS regressions for the countries. Robust standard errors, obtained by clustered 
standard error calculations, are being used for the pool (panel) of countries.  
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Table 9 – Forecast encompassing tests for period t+1 
SGP EC Concl. SGP EC SGP EC SGP EC
BE 0.18 0.09 0.91 = 0.70 0.57 0.50 0.16 0.60 0.42 Tie
DK 0.50 0.25 0.75 = 0.45 0.81 0.84 0.67 0.83 0.69 Tie
DE 0.93 0.47 0.53 = 0.46 0.51 0.83 0.72 0.23 0.30 Tie
EL 0.10 0.95 0.05 = 0.32 0.55 0.11 0.83 0.79 0.31 Tie
ES 0.90 0.55 0.45 = 0.82 0.55 0.59 0.74 0.62 0.89 Tie
FR 0.06 0.97 0.03 EC (?) 0.06 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.08 EC
IE 0.27 0.13 0.87 = 0.92 0.52 0.93 0.55 0.50 0.54 Tie
IT 0.05 0.98 0.02 EC 0.15 0.40 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04 EC
LU 1.00 0.50 0.50 = 0.54 0.44 0.31 0.85 1.00 0.76 Tie
NL 0.62 0.69 0.31 = 0.41 0.79 0.39 0.98 0.62 0.47 Tie
AT 0.19 0.09 0.91 = 0.31 0.26 0.39 0.17 0.48 0.44 Tie
PT 0.03 0.99 0.01 EC 0.58 0.87 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.07 EC
FI 0.65 0.33 0.67 = 0.84 0.77 0.98 0.69 0.83 0.82 Tie
SE 0.28 0.86 0.14 = 0.19 0.11 0.32 0.78 0.47 0.32 Tie
UK 0.99 0.51 0.49 = 0.58 0.69 0.31 0.31 0.60 0.38 Tie
Pool 0.08 0.96 0.04 EC (?) 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.97 0.29 0.21 EC
BE 0.02 0.99 0.01 EC 0.40 0.61 0.11 0.78 0.59 0.48 Tie
DK 0.20 0.90 0.10 = 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.52 0.11 0.38 Tie
DE 0.86 0.57 0.43 = 0.27 0.48 0.55 0.81 0.86 0.33 Tie
EL 0.17 0.92 0.08 = 0.70 0.96 0.04 0.18 0.10 0.29 EC
ES 0.22 0.11 0.89 = 0.35 0.33 0.57 0.31 0.15 0.34 Tie
FR 0.84 0.58 0.42 = 0.23 0.66 0.33 0.53 0.24 0.66 Tie
IE 0.48 0.24 0.76 = 0.69 0.92 0.99 0.34 0.72 0.41 Tie
IT 0.12 0.94 0.06 = 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.28 0.21 0.92 EC
LU 0.42 0.79 0.21 = 0.15 0.87 0.32 0.96 0.30 0.65 Tie
NL 0.67 0.34 0.66 = 0.86 0.70 0.84 0.49 0.11 0.11 Tie
AT 0.00 0.00 1.00 SGP 0.78 0.27 0.22 0.02 0.13 0.07 SGP
PT 0.23 0.88 0.12 = 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.42 0.43 0.97 Tie
FI 0.97 0.48 0.52 = 0.82 0.46 0.72 0.66 0.03 0.03 Tie
SE 0.02 0.99 0.01 EC 0.11 0.45 0.02 0.21 0.09 0.21 EC
UK 0.90 0.55 0.45 = 0.37 0.04 0.38 0.55 0.11 0.18 SGP
Pool 0.07 0.97 0.03 EC (?) 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.26 EC
GDP growth
Budget balance
Equality
better forecast:
FE(2) FE(3) FE 
overall 
"winner"
better forecast: better forecast:better forecast:Country
P-value mDM test for: FE(1)
 
Notes: see Table 8. 
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Table 10 – Forecast encompassing tests for period t+2 
SGP EC Concl. SGP EC SGP EC SGP EC
BE 0.60 0.30 0.70 = 0.47 0.88 0.53 0.18 0.04 0.04 Tie
DK 0.62 0.31 0.69 = 0.20 0.17 0.95 0.14 0.93 0.55 Tie
DE 0.57 0.29 0.71 = 0.73 0.21 0.77 0.29 0.17 0.05 SGP
EL 0.23 0.89 0.11 = 0.30 0.24 0.14 0.81 0.95 0.51 Tie
ES 0.16 0.08 0.92 = 0.68 0.72 0.56 0.25 0.56 0.46 Tie
FR 1.00 0.50 0.50 = 0.30 0.45 0.54 1.00 0.03 0.01 Tie
IE 0.28 0.86 0.14 = 0.06 0.91 0.05 0.31 0.76 0.68 EC
IT 0.10 0.95 0.05 = 0.93 0.95 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 Tie
LU 0.74 0.63 0.37 = 0.97 0.44 0.51 0.89 0.49 0.33 Tie
NL 0.32 0.16 0.84 = 0.32 0.38 0.17 0.01 0.36 0.21 SGP
AT 0.59 0.30 0.70 = 0.91 0.90 0.99 0.57 0.53 0.48 Tie
PT 0.00 1.00 0.00 EC 0.22 0.38 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 EC
FI 0.91 0.45 0.55 = 0.75 0.13 0.82 0.58 0.77 0.77 Tie
SE 0.67 0.34 0.66 = 0.41 0.52 0.94 0.42 0.66 0.35 Tie
UK 0.42 0.21 0.79 = 0.94 0.35 0.86 0.05 0.15 0.17 SGP
Pool 0.67 0.66 0.34 = 0.03 0.96 0.11 0.44 0.03 0.00 EC
BE 0.26 0.87 0.13 = 0.35 0.48 0.09 0.67 0.59 0.27 Tie
DK 0.28 0.86 0.14 = 0.35 0.14 0.13 0.60 0.24 0.68 Tie
DE 0.76 0.62 0.38 = 0.08 0.04 0.39 0.99 0.97 0.30 SGP
EL 0.07 0.96 0.04 EC (?) 0.77 0.79 0.03 0.15 0.33 0.86 EC
ES 0.27 0.14 0.86 = 0.21 0.42 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.34 Tie
FR 0.45 0.78 0.22 = 0.17 0.16 0.24 0.99 0.21 0.81 Tie
IE 0.66 0.67 0.33 = 0.06 0.10 0.40 0.77 0.64 0.05 Tie
IT 0.44 0.78 0.22 = 0.12 0.18 0.03 0.86 0.14 0.28 EC
LU 0.38 0.19 0.81 = 0.80 0.88 0.57 0.19 0.78 0.67 Tie
NL 0.20 0.10 0.90 = 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.23 Tie
AT 0.06 0.03 0.97 SGP (?) 0.12 0.03 0.58 0.01 0.19 0.62 SGP
PT 0.44 0.78 0.22 = 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.77 0.15 0.94 Tie
FI 0.79 0.40 0.60 = 0.20 0.18 0.85 0.64 0.16 0.27 Tie
SE 0.49 0.75 0.25 = 0.44 0.28 0.37 0.88 0.52 0.92 Tie
UK 0.47 0.24 0.76 = 0.31 0.09 0.66 0.10 0.44 0.29 Tie
Pool 0.56 0.72 0.28 = 0.04 0.49 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.45 EC
Budget balance
better forecast: better forecast:
GDP growth
better forecast:Country
P-value mDM test for: FE(1) FE(2) FE(3) FE 
overall 
"winner"Equality
better forecast:
 
Notes: see Table 8. 
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